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William J. Baumol and J. Gregory Sidak propose that firms controlling
competitive access sell those inputs to their competitors at prices that reflect
(1) direct per unit incremental cost plus (2) the opportunity cost to the input
supplier of the sale of a unit of input. The purpose of this Response is to
question the authors' claims of general applicability for their theory. Rules for
pricing competitive access must follow from the broad vision of the appropriate
regulatory transition to deregulation and not vice versa. Different regulatory
regimes and different factual circumstances will produce different rules
governing competitive access, including the rules for pricing access.
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Introduction
In this edition of the Yale Journal on Regulation, William J. Baumol and
J. Gregory Sidak (Baumol and Sidak) propose pricing standards for regulated
firms controlling access to facilities necessary for their non-vertically integrated
rivals to compete. They propose that such finns controlling competitive access
sell those inputs to their competitors at prices that reflect (1) "direct per-unit
incremental cost"' plus (2)"the opportunity cost to the input supplier of the sale
of a unit of input."'2 Baumol and Sidak make a number of claims in support
of what they call efficient component pricing or the parity principle, including:
1. "The efficient component-pricing rule is applicable generally."3
2. "[T]he efficient component-pricing rule... is simply another
use of the incremental-cost principles that achieve economic
efficiency."
3. "[R]eaders will lose little in following the logic in the remainder
of our discussion if they treat average-incremental cost and
average-variable cost as synonyms. '
4. "In a competitive market, an incumbent Will levy an access
charge on a new entrant that will cover both the direct
incremental cost of providing the access and its opportunity
cost."6
1. William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors, I I YALE J. ON REG. -
171, 178 (1994).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 202.
4. Id. at 173.
5. Id. at 177.
6. Id. at 201.
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Vol. 11 : 203, 1994
Response: Inputs Sold to Competitors
The following discussion will employ the "parity principle" terminology rather
than "efficient component pricing" because the latter is a misnomer: Baumol
and Sidak's pricing rule is not necessarily the one dictated by considerations
of economic efficiency.
The purpose of this Response is to question the authors' claims of general
applicability for their theory.7 We must reframe the debate to consider
explicitly the context of regulatory objectives and institutions, rather than claim
general application of rules developed on the basis of hypothetical examples
that may be unrealistic in practice. Simply put, rules for pricing competitive
access must follow from the broad vision of the appropriate regulatory
transition to deregulation and not vice versa. Different regulatory regimes and
different factual circumstances will produce different rules governing
competitive access, including the rules for pricing access. One size does not
fit all.
The lack of universal application of the theory is demonstrated below with
a counterexample from an actual case study. This counterexample demonstrates
that it could be a particularly serious mistake to apply the pricing rule in
situations where the highly restrictive assumptions made by Baumol and Sidak
in their hypothetical examples are not valid.
Before considering the counterexample, another example will help illustrate
the lack of general applicability of the rule. Followers of the debate over
competitive access in the electric utility industry will recognize Baumol and
Sidak's parity principle as simply another restatement of the avoided cost
doctrine (see below for an example illustrating this equivalence). Viewed in this
light, the parity principle is really nothing new. Under the doctrine, competitive
suppliers who qualify are allowed revenues equal to the utility's avoided cost.
If applied according to its intention, the avoided cost rule ensures that the
competitive supplier gets the benefits of any efficiency gains from entry, and
the utility and its customers are left indifferent.
However, such a rule is not the only one that can be justified
economically. Many utilities, for example, have developed bidding systems as
an alternative to the avoided cost rule in order to ensure the flowthrough of
benefits of competition to ratepayers. More recently, head-to-head competition
to get the business of the final customer via access to transmission lines seems
to be capturing the imagination of many who follow the debate.
7. To avoid auto-plagiarism, I will not repeat my own previous writings on this subject. For further
discussion of alternatives to the efficient component pricing rule, see WILLIAM B. TYE, THE THEORY OF
CONTESTABLE MARKETS: APPLICATIONS TO REGULATORY AND ANTITRUST PROBLEMS IN THE RAIL
INDUSTRY (1990); WILLIAM B. TYE ET AL., THE TRANSITION TO DEREGULATION (1991)" William B. Tye,
Competitive Access: A Comparative Industry Approach to the Essential Facility Doctrine, 8 ENERGY LJ.
337 (1987); William B. Tye. Pricing Market Access for Regulated Firms, 29 LOGISTICS & TRANSP. REV.
39(1993).
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The lack of general applicability of the parity principle is demonstrated
first in Part I by showing the-sensitivity of Baumol and Sidak's conclusions
to the implicit assumptions in their hypotheticals. Part II illustrates the lack of
general applicability by examining a counterexample taken from an actual case
study of a proposed application of the rule. The counterexample shows that the
parity pinciple does not necessarily achieve competition on equal terms, nor
will it necessarily be produced via voluntary negotiations among competitors,
as its proponents often claim in practice. The Response closes with a warning
against applying the rule generally without first determining whether the factual
circumstances are consistent with the implicit assumptions used in the
hypotheticals.
I. Claims of General Applicability
Baumol and Sidak consider a railroad competitive access problem as their
pricing paradigm. They then conclude that their results are "unambiguous, ' '
can be deduced by reference to simple hypothetical examples and elementary
economic principles, and are generally applicable. 9 They argue that competitors
"must" charge the price governed by the parity principle; else higher or lower
prices competitively disadvantage one of the rivals and produce economic
inefficiency."
A. Significance of Implicit Assumptions
The authors explicitly or implicitly make a number of specific assumptions
in reaching these conclusions. The chief efficiency concerns they mention are
efficient routing decisions and efficient entry decisions. The nonintegrated
competitor is assumed to have sunk no costs" (or is assumed to have no need
to recover them through efficient pricing of access). Very' importantly, it is
assumed that regulators have decided that efficient pricing of the final product
is to be achieved with regulatory intervention, not by price competition among
alternate firms encouraged by regulatory rules to protect competitive access.
Baumol and Sidak draw their conclusions of general applicability by
relying on hypothetical examples that incorporate a set of highly specialized
M. Baumol & Sidak, supra note 1, at 173.
9. Id. at.
10. Id. at.
11. "Sunk costs ... are costs that (in some short or intermediate run) cannot be eliminated, even by
total cessation of production." WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY
OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 280 (1992).
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assumptions.' 2 Before accepting claims of general applicability, we must
carefully examine the consequences of violating these assumptions.
What if both firms have, in fact, sunk costs under the prior regulatory
regime? What if regulators wish to encourage competitive access as a means
of achieving effective competition in the market for the final product? And
what if regulators are seeking to grant competitive access to a merged firm's
facilities to restore competition eliminated by a merger? Is the advice to apply
the parity principle nevertheless unambiguous? We shall soon see that under
such changed circumstances, application of the parity principle can be a grave
threat to a successful transition to deregulation and hardly a general rule for
pricing access.
Indeed, we need look no further than the telecommunications access
pricing example discussed by the authors for an illustration of the lack of
general applicability of the rule. Baumol and Sidak assure us here that "[t]he
same logic applies without modification to the pricing of access to the local
telecommunications loop."' 3 Nevertheless, Baumol and Sidak now agree that
the Court was right to conclude that the rule in fact needs much modification,
precisely because the assumptions they employ to justify the rule are not
universally valid. Clearly, when Baumol and Sidak's assumptions are violated
the parity principle no longer serves as the unambiguous answer to access
pricing. Nor are we told the correct price of access once the Court's objections
are considered and the parity principle is rejected as invalid.
B. Conflicts Between Theory and Practice
Applications of these principles in actual regulatory proceedings by
Professor Baumol, together with his colleague, Robert D. Willig, also cast grave
doubts about the general applicability of this rule. Either the rule is not
generally applicable or unexplained discrepancies in the claims of the rule's
general applicability require further examination. Either way, difficult decisions
on rules for competitive access cannot be based simply on uncritical acceptance
of the hypothetical examples contained in the Baumol and Sidak essay.
12. Indeed elemental alarm bells ought to go off when we are told that a regime of competition that
ensures that a monopolist will always be indifferent to the entry of new competitors will "ensurelI proper
pricing and efficiency." Baumol & Sidak, supra note I, at 186 (emphasis added).
13. Id. at 189 (emphasis added). Baumol and Sidak claim that the rule can be applied without
modification, yet concur that the rule is in fact invalid in New Zealand. Their rationale is difficult to
reconcile with their statement: "lTlhe analysis underlying the rule indicates how the LEC should price the
finalproduct, intraLATA toll service, when selling that product to consumers." Id. at 198 (emphasis added).
How are we to reconcile (I) Baumol and Sidak's claims in this quote and the surrounding text that
the opportunity cost standard allows the prices of the final output to be determined based on their proposed
rules for the price of access with (2) their agreement in the New Zealand case that "a set of complementary
rules" to set the price of the final product is indeed required because the parity principle gives the wrong
price of access! Id. at 195.
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For example, proponents of the parity principle have demonstrated extreme
hostility to the use of mandated competitive access as a mechanism for inducing
price competition in the market for the final product or for using mandated
competitive access as a mechanism for restoring competition in the market for
the final product that has been eliminated by a merger. In the Santa
Fe-Southern Pacific Merger Proceeding before the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC), Professor Baumol stated that the ICC should rely on
voluntary negotiations rather than require competitive access to solve the
problems arising from reduced competition after a merger:
Q. Now, you would agree with me, would you not, that if the
Commission finds an instance in which it believes the profits
of the merged line will be too high, that it is appropriate for
them to impose trackage rights as a remedy to that situation, is
it not?
A. [Professor Baumol] I am glad you asked me that question,
because that is the worst possible remedy that a malevolent
mind could devise ....
Professor Baumol has frequently spoken out against the use of regulatory
intervention to set the competitive price of access. Rather he has encouraged
regulators to rely upon voluntary negotiations between the two rail carriers:
[V]oluntary negotiations between CSXT and FEC should lead to use
of efficient CSXT-FEC joint7line routes rather than inefficient CSXT
single-line routes, so long as rates and divisions are freely negotiable.
This proposition holds even if CSXT has monopoly power over part
of the joint-line routes, and follows from the self-interest of both
CSXT and FEC .... The effectiveness of voluntary negotiations in
maintaining efficient routes is not just theoretical; it is confirmed by
the observed behavior of CSXT and other railroads, and by the
analogous make-or-buy decisions that countless firms make
throughout the American economy every day.'-
"The efficient component-pricing rule provides a competitive-market standard
(that is, an efficiency standard) for settlement of such disputes. It yields an
14. Record at 10, 083, Santa Fe S. Pac. Corp., 2 I.C.C.2d 709 (1986) (Finance Docket No. 30,400)
(emphasis added).
15. See Rebuttal Verified Statement of Robert D. Willig and William J. Baumol (May 7, 1993) at 20,
Seaboard Air Line R.R., 1993 ICC LEXIS 284 (Dec. 15, 1993) (Finance Docket No. 21,215).
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unambiguous price for the switching services, one that is called for by the
public interest. No regulatory intervention is needed to impose that price."' 6
C. Conflicts Between the Parity Principle and the Theory of Voluntary
Negotiations
The view that the optimal input price will be forthcoming without
regulatory intervention is foreshadowed by statements in the Baumol and Sidak
essay that firms controlling access should be permitted, not necessarily required,
to apply the rule. For example, they hint that it is the obligation of rival
suppliers of pharmaceutical services to set the price of access to motivate the
owner of the bottleneck facility to provide access on efficient terms.' 7 The
strong support for voluntary negotiations by the proponents of the opportunity
cost theory is difficult to reconcile with statements by Baumol and Sidak that
appear to say contrarily that regulators ought to intervene in these pricing
decisions. Indeed, I shall show below that voluntary negotiations will not in
general produce the result called for by the parity principle.
Additionally, Baumol and Sidak do not tell us precisely which institutional
arrangements supposedly achieve the desired pricing regime. Should regulators
intervene to set the price of access? Relying on the two firms to set the optimal
price without regulatory intervention seems highly unlikely to result in the price
Baumol and Sidak label as economically efficient. Baumol and Sidak go to
great lengths to argue that the economically appropriate price should leave the
owners of the facility indifferent. But what would motivate an indifferent firm
voluntarily to allow entry by a more efficient competitor, the result Professor
Baumol forecasts in the above quotes? Another institutional arrangement would
appear to be a contract between the two firms. However, as shown below,
adherents of the theory have urged regulators and the courts not to enforce such
contracts because they are purportedly inconsistent with the parity principle.
D. Dependence on a Particular Vision of the Regulatory Transition
Choosing the parity principle as the means of accomplishing competitive
access is clearly dependent on a particular vision of what the most appropriate
future regulatory regime should be. Baumol and Sidak dispense with any
requirement to specify the goals and regulatory mechanisms chosen by
regulators and claim general applicability of their rule for any regime of
competition or regulation. But their theory relies heavily on the assumption that
16. Verified Statement of William J. Baumol (May 21, 1990) at 30, Iowa Power & Light Co. v.
Burlington N.R.R., No. 40224 (I.C.C. filed Apr. 27, 1989), dismissed with prejudice, 1991 WL 219374
(I.C.C. Oct. 29, 1991).
17. Baumol & Sidak, supra note 1, at 182.
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the competitive access rule seeks to achieve efficient use of inputs but not
competition in the sale of the final products.
Should pricing under this rule be extended to every regulatory transition?
The answer is no, if the vision of the transition to deregulation is the
contractual equilibrium. In this case, regulators may intervene on a limited basis
during a transition to set the price of access and other prices to levels that
would have emerged under contracts signed prior to sinking costs." The
contractual equilibrium is an explicit recipe for regulatory withdrawal, while
the parity principle as stated here relies on continued regulation of both input
prices and the prices of the final product. 9
E. Monopoly Profits Are Not Really Incremental Costs
By means of semantic devices, Baumol and Sidak's theory translates
monopoly profits into incremental costs and opportunity costs. Baumol and
Sidak are careful to prove mathematically that their parity principle or
indifference principle achieves its intended objective: any competitor that enters
the market indemnifies the owner of the bottleneck facility from the financial
consequences of new competition, even if this requires the entrant to pay the
incumbent a price that includes a measure of monopoly profits. Baumol and
Sidak agree that this is true, but point the blame at the failure to adequately
regulate the price of the final product.
However, consider for a moment that regulators may have a different goal
in mind for setting competitive access than the one implicitly assumed by
Baumol and Sidak. Suppose that regulators are using competitive access as a
mechanism to achieve effective competition for the sale of the final product in
a transition to deregulation. Including opportunity cost of the regulated firm in
the price of access to new entrants would forever frustrate this goal.
18. Because elements uf service in an integrated network are sometimes
characterized by economies of scale and barriers to entry, at least in the short
run, effective competition is not always immediately possible across the entire
spectrum of services offered in the regulated industry.
A commonly proposed solution is to design policies that enhance
competition wherever possible by giving all competitors access to the bottleneck
portions of the network on roughly equal terms to prevent vertical foreclosures
of competition across the network . . . . tLlimited provision for access and
pricing rules on the monopoly portions of the system are sometimes deemed
necessary to effect a successful transition.
John R. Meyer & William B. Tye, Toward Achieving Workalle Competition in Industries Undergoing a
Transition to Deregulation: A Contractual Equilibrium Approach, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 273, 276 (1988)
(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
19. Note, for example, Baumol and Sidak's concurrence with the court in New Zealand that their
proposed access rules are incompatible with a regime of "light-handed regulation." Baumol & Sidak, supra
note 1, at 194.
210
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Opportunity cost is a misleading and extremely confusing term in the
current context. Under the assumptions of Baumol and Sidak, the same
customer is using the same bottleneck facility regardless o1 which carrier serves
the competitive portion of the route. The only question is whether the carrier
seeking access will be an effective competitor. Revenues lost to incumbent
firms as a result of competition are not an opportunity cost for the use of the
bottleneck facility in the true economic sense of the word, as would occur if
one customer's use of the facility displaced that of another customer's.
Careful diction is also necessary when the parity principle is justified by
reference to pricing in competitive markets: "In a competitive market, an
incumbent will levy an access charge on a new entrant that will cover both the
direct incremental cost of providing the access and its opportunity cost. '
Clearly this outcome does arise in competitive markets. New entrants into
competitive markets do not indemnify incumbents for the opportunity cost of
reduced profits. Baumol and Sidak's analogy of the landlord's rental to a tenant
breaks down because incumbent firms do not own property rights to customer
access in competitive markets for which they must be compensated by entrants.
To do so would eliminate the incentive for entry in order to take advantage of
temporarily supracompetitive prices in competitive markets.
The dangers of accepting the parity principle as the only appropriate
mechanism for pricing competitive access go beyond the absence of any
encouragement to competition in the sale of the final product in a transition to
deregulation. Its adherents often use these hypotheticals to support the
conclusion that any alternative pricing rule is inefficient. Another danger is that
the parity principle becomes the rationale for striking down competitive access
mechanisms that do encourage price competition in the sale of the final product
and are more appropriate in regulatory transitions that do not fit Baumol and
Sidak's specialized assumptions.
The lack of general applicability of the parity principle and its
accompanying doctrine of voluntary negotiations may be illustrated with a
counterexample in which Professor Baumol and his colleague Robert D. Willig
address the issue of competitive access in the rail industry.2
I1. A Counterexample: The Post-Merger Rail Competitive Access Problem
CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSXT) petitioned the ICC to reopen the
Seaboard Air Line Railroad Company (SAL) merger with the Atlantic Coast
20. Id. at 201.
21. Along with Professors Baumol and Willig, the author of this comment was also involved in the
proceeding. See Verified Statement of William B. Tye (Mar. 29, 1993), Seaboard Air Line, (Finance Docket
No. 21,215).
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Line Railroad Company (ACL)2 2 in an attempt to remove a variant of the so-
called "DT&I conditions. 23 These conditions were imposed as a precondition
to the Commission's approval of the 1963 merger that created the Seaboard
Coast Line Railroad (SCL). SCL subsequently became part of the CSX system
as a result of subsequent mergers approved by the Commission. Professor
Baumol filed joint testimony with his colleague, Professor Willig, strongly
supporting the elimination of the merger conditions. They criticized regulatory
intervention into the pricing of competitive access and instead urged the ICC
to rely on voluntary negotiations between the carriers to solve the problem of
post-merger competitive access.
A. Assumed Facts in a Rail Competitive Access Proceeding
The CSX-FEC controversy provides a case study for understanding the
problems of post-merger competitive access in the rail industry and the
weaknesses of the parity principle and the accompanying theory of voluntary
negotiations. At issue is that one carier controls a bottleneck route or essential
facility that connecting carrier(s) must have access to if they are to compete.
When competitive access problems occur due to a merger, a procompetitive
access policy should assure competitive access on equal terms to restore the
equal competitive footing which existed before the merger. Competition on
equal terms means that ownership of the bottleneck route should not convey
a competitive advantage or disadvantage. The objective is to establish a
contractual equilibrium or regulatory contract as a substitute for the competitive
regime eliminated by the merger.
Merger conditions address the need to protect FEC from opportunistic
behavior. Because of sunk capital costs, a contract (regulatory or private) is
needed to protect a more efficient connecting carrier, like FEC, from
opportunistic behavior by the merged single-line carier. Once such a contract
is in place, the single-line carrier has strong economic incentives to break the
contract and either apply a price squeeze24 to the more efficient connecting
carrier or cancel the joint route entirely.
22. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 320 I.C.C. 122 (1963), modified, 360 I.C.C. 592 (1979).
23. DT&I conditions have been traditionally imposed on railroad mergers by the ICC since 1922. They
are aimed at limiting the anticompetitive effects of a merger by mandating certain relationships between
the consolidated entity and other railroads. The phrase derives from Detroit, T. & I.R.R., 275 I.C.C. 455,
492 (1950), wherein the Commission set out these conditions in their standard form.
24. A "price squeeze" is generally defined to be a situation where a firm manipulates the input and
output prices faced by a competitor to prevent that firm from competing effectively.
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The factual circumstances of the typical rail competitive access case arising
from a vertical merger may be illustrated by Figure 1. All three carriers are
assumed to have incurred substantial sunk costs and must price well in excess
of incremental costs to become revenue adequate. Assume in Figure 1 that
Carrier B competes from Y to Z and then interchanges traffic with Carrier A,
which serves X to Y. Assume also that Carrier C competes from Y to Z and
also interchanges through traffic with Carrier A at Y. Now assume that Carrier
A and Carrier C merge to produce a single carrier.
The competitive access problem is that Carrier B has no ability to compete
for the through traffic without access to a direct competitor's services from X
to Y. If denied such access, Carrier B is said to be subject to a vertical
foreclosure of competition. Competitive access problems generally occur as a
result of changed circumstances since Carrier B depended on Carrier A as a
friendly connection prior to the merger. In most mergers prior to the Staggers
Act,25 the Commission relied on the merger conditions to preserve post-merger
competition. More recently the preferred tools for preserving the competition
lost by the merger are trackage rights, whereby Carried B operates its trains
over the merged carrier's tracks.
B. The Goals of a Procompetitive Access Policy
The logic for a procompetitive access merger policy is relatively
straightforward: assure competitive access on equal terms to restore the equal
competitive footing which existed before the merger. The competitive access
problem is most acute in situations where both the firm seeking access and the
firm controlling access require prices in excess of incremental costs in order
to cover total costs (fixed costs); and also where the firm seeking access has
sunk considerable investments which must interchange with facilities which are
owned by a competitor (sunk costs).
Furthermore, it is assumed that a regime of competition, once eliminated,
would be very difficult to restore because of barriers to entry. In these
circumstances, solutions to the competitive access problem should meet the
following goals:
1. to preserve and enhance price and service competition
among rail carriers;
2. to do so with a minimum of regulatory intervention;
3. to do so with maximum reliance on contracts and privately
negotiated solutions;
25. Staggers Rail Act of 1980, codified at49 U.S.C. § 10101 (1982); Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1114 (1982) and in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.).
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4. to provide incentives for efficient provision of rail
services, including the most efficient routing of iraffic;
5. to promote an equitable and efficient division of net
revenues among rail carriers on joint-line movements in
order to prevent cross-subsidy;
6. to preserve competition in the industry in the long run; and
7. to advance the goal of revenue adequacy.
Revenue adequacy in an industry with substantial fixed and sunk costs
requires revenues well in excess of incremental costs. In these circumstances,
prices in excess of incremental costs should not be viewed as supra-competitive
prices or necessarily generating excess profits. Rather, they should be viewed
as necessary for firm survival. Indeed, as we shall soon see, prices equal to or
only slightly above incremental costs cannot be deemed to be competitive in
such circumstances, precisely because they doom the enterprise charging such
prices to financial ruin.
Regulation of post-merger competitive access should be designed to afford
the parties the protection they would have obtained through contracts before
sinking costs, knowing that a merger would occur. FEC would not have built
a railroad without assurances that it would get a certain amount of the interstate
traffic that currently moves to and from Florida on CSXT. The objective is to
establish a contractual equilibrium or regulatory contract as a substitute for the
pre-merger competitive regime."
C. The Standard of Competition on Equal Terms
If a decision is made to preserve competition that is reduced or eliminated
by a rail merger, competitive access in such circumstances should be designed
to achieve competition on equal terms." Competition on equal terms means
in the present circumstances that ownership of a bottleneck facility should be
competitively neutral: ownership of such a facility should convey neither a
competitive advantage nor disadvantage. In short, (1) fix it only where it is
26. See Meyer & Tye, supra note IN, at 290-97, for a discussion of substituting contracts for regulation
in the transition to deregulation. Note that this vision of a contractual equilibrium as a replacement for
regulation differs significantly from that of Professors Baumol and Willig. They apparently view the
competition as akin to spot markets whereby competitors sink costs in idiosyncratic investments with neither
regulatory nor private contractual guarantees against opportunistic behavior. By the same token, Baumol
and Sidak ignore the sunk cost problem entirely by assuming that average incremental costs and average
variable costs are synonymous. This procedure effectively ignores the central problem in these disputes-the
recovery of sunk costs by the foreclosed competitor seeking access. This example illustrates once again the
high degree of sensitivity of Baumol and Sidak's conclusions to their highly specific assumptions.
27. The economic test is designed to give content to the Supreme Court's legal objective that access
must be afforded "upon such just and reasonable terms and regulations as will, in respect of use, character
and cost of service, place every such company upon as nearly an equal plane as may be .... United States
v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 411 (1912).
216
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broken; (2) do not allow a breakdown of effective competition in one part of
the regulated industry to infect the other parts; and (3) minimize the scope of
regulatory intervention. Competition on equal terms is designed to accomplish
these objectives. Below I show how this can be accomplished with private or
regulatory contracts over joint rates, through routes, and revenue divisions.
D. Contractual Solutions to the Rail Competitive Access Problem
Historically the solution to the rail competitive access problem was a
regulatory contract whereby the traffic interchange, joint rates, joint routes and
divisions were established by regulation. With such rules in hand, Carrier
B in Figure 1 could invest in sunk facilities knowing that it could rely on a
regulatory guarantee of competition on equal terms. There is, of course, no
reason in principle that the same guarantees to Carrier B of access on equal
terms could not be achieved via a private contract-provided the contract were
signed before Carrier B sunk its cost. Otherwise Carrier B would be in the
same situation as a tenant inquiring into the cost of air conditioning provided
by the landlord after the tenant had sunk hundreds of thousands of dollars in
leasehold improvements. The tenant would be highly vulnerable to a holdup.
Post-merger traffic conditions address the fundamental need for a
contractual solution to post-merger competitive access. The problem is
illustrated by several scenarios of the classic rat-tail situation depicted in Figure
2. Once again, Carrier B must connect with A to participate in traffic from X
to Z. Carrier A is the only rail carrier serving X to Y and operates a competing
route from Y to Z as a result of the merger discussed in connection with
Figure 1. Panel 1 of Figure 2 shows a hypothetical example with facts similar
to those claimed by CSXT in the proceeding figure. CSXT is in a situation like
Carrier A in which it connects with a more efficient Carrier B (much like FEC)
that must price in excess of incremental cost to become revenue adequate. Panel
1 lists the relevant assumptions regarding the costs of Carriers A and B.
Following Panel 1, Carrier A can serve the bottleneck portion of the route, X-
Y, at an incremental cost of $40. Carrier A can serve the contested portion of
the route, Y-Z, for an incremental cost of $15. Carrier B is more efficient and
can serve Y-Z for an incremental cost of only $10. However, Carrier B has
previously sunk an investment that requires revenues of $10 per movement in
order to recover the investment with a fair rate of return. 29 That is, Carrier B,
28. For some time now it has been recognized that regulation is a form of contract that allows economic
entities to sink costs to idiosyncratic relationships without the need of the private contract that would
otherwise have been necessary to protect firms from opportunistic behavior. See Victor P. Goldberg,
Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 BELL J. ECON. 426 (1976).
29. Proponents of the parity principle tend to focus on the role of access pricing in encouraging efficient
entry and achieving static efficiency gains by encouraging the traffic to move over the most efficient route.
Based on these considerations, it might be argued that the existing situation implies that uneconomic entry
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although more efficient than Carrier A, requires revenues of $20 for movement
over Y-Z in order to be made revenue adequate, whereas Carrier A can serve
Y-Z at an incremental cost of $15.
This hypothetical example will illustrate two major economic principles
relevant to understanding the economic issues raised by Professors Baumol and
Willig's recommendation to remove the merger conditions:
1. A contract (regulatory or private) specifying joint rates, routes
and divisions is needed to protect a more efficient connecting
carrier from opportunistic behavior by the merged single-line
carrier; and
2. Once the more efficient connecting carrier has such a contract,
the single-line carrier has strong economic incentives to break
the contract and either apply a price squeeze to the more
efficient connecting carrier or cancel the joint-line route entirely.
Historically such a situation has been addressed through regulation of joint
rates, through routes, and divisions, or by post-merger conditions. Assume that
Carrier B views the merger conditions as a regulatory contract that protects it
from opportunistic and expedient behavior by Carrier A. As a more efficient
competitor, it competes effectively in the market. Given the regulatory
environment, Carrier A and B negotiate traffic interchange, joint route, joint
rate, and division agreements that permit the more efficient Carrier B to
compete on equal terms, just as before the merger.
Panel 2 shows the result of a contract or merger conditions governing joint
traffic that allows Carrier B the opportunity to recover the cost of its
investment. It is not necessary for the contract or merger conditions to prevent
rate competition between single-line and joint-line traffic. It is necessary,
however, to prohibit Carrier A from taking actions that would prevent Carrier
B from competing on equal terms.3" Clearly, Carrier B never would have
entered the market, despite its greater efficiency, if it believed that Carrier A,
through a price squeeze, could always appropriate both its efficiency gain and
the revenues in excess of incremental costs needed to amortize its sunk costs.
Moreover, having sunk costs in the past, Carrier B would not sink additional
by one of the carriers had occurred at some point in the past. However, in the rail merger case, entry is not
an issue. To get situations similar to those in Figure 2, we need only assume a merger between Carrier A
and Carrier C in Figure 1, plus a typical oligopoly situation where all competitors do not necessarily have
the same incremental costs.
"30. Note that the point is not that Carrier B has a prior right to the net revenues needed to recover sunk
costs because it has the greater efficiency. Rather the objective is to require the two firms to compete on
equal terms. For a discussion of the more general case where both firms cannot be made revenue adequate,
see WILLIAM B. TYE ET AL., supra note 7, at ch. 7.2.
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costs in the form of efficiency enhancing investment if it expected that Carrier
A could appropriate these.
In the hypothetical example in Panel 2, the revenue is split with $80 to
Carrier A and $20 to Carrier B. Note that less efficient Carrier A still has an
incentive to compete on the Y to Z movement because the single-line route is
more profitable with $45 net revenue. Note however, that the single-line carrier
must bear 100 percent of its inefficiency if it attempts to compete by offering
a single-line route. Likewise, Carrier B is strongly motivated to encourage
traffic to the more efficient joint-line route.
E. The Incentives for Opportunistic Behavior by a Bottleneck Carrier
Assume that Carrier B has signed a contract, or has merger conditions, that
allow it to recover its sunk cost of $10 per unit. However, Carrier A has a
strong incentive to break the contract or eliminate the conditions and engage
in what economists call opportunistic behavior.3' If Carrier A can somehow
void the agreement, it can appropriate all of Carrier B's efficiency gains as well
as the revenues Carrier B needs in excess of its incremental costs to recover
the $10 in fixed costs.
Panel 3 shows the consequences of Carrier A responding to incentives for
opportunistic behavior. Assume that new rules and regulations give Carrier A
the opportunity to unilaterally renounce its prior agreements with Carrier B.
Such an opportunity would occur if Carrier A could get out of the merger
conditions and the contracts it signed with Carrier B based on those conditions.
Panel 3 shows that it will be profitable for Carrier A to do so. Whereas Carrier
A can earn net revenues of $40 for joint-line movements under the contract or
merger conditions (Panel 2), it can earn in excess of $45 on the same joint-line
movements if it can get out of the contract or merger conditions and engage
in a price squeeze (Panel 3).
Professors Baumol and Willig's theory of voluntary negotiations provides
a guideline on how Carrier A should engage in such opportunistic behavior.
31. The incentives for opportunistic behavior in similar situations are discussed by Benjamin Klein
et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, J.L. & ECoN.
297 (1978):
An appropriable quasi rent is not a monopoly rent in the usual sense, that is, the increased
value of an asset protected from market entry over the value it would have had in an open
market. An appropriable quasi rent can occur with no market closure or restrictions placed on
rival assets. Once installed, an asset may be so expensive to remove or so specialized to a
particular user that if the price paid to the owner were somehow reduced the asset's services
to that user would not be reduced. Thus, even if there were free and open competition for entry
to the market, the specialization of the installed asset to a particular user (or more accurately
the high costs of making it available to oIthers) creates a quasi rent, but no "monopoly" rent.
Id. at 299.
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One option is to engage in a price squeeze. Carrier B will accept an offer of
$10+A (and earn net revenues of A), where A is the "peppercorn" above
incremental cost that induces Carrier B to participate, rather than have the
traffic move over the single-line route and earn no net revenues. Despite its
greater efficiency, Carrier B will, however, be unable to recover its total costs
after the price squeeze, since A is not enough to cover its fixed costs. Thus, in
this hypothetical example, Carrier B moves from a position of revenue
adequacy to being revenue inadequate.32
This example shows that Carrier A has no incentive voluntarily to agree
to interchange traffic with a more efficient connecting carrier at revenue
divisions that permit Carrier B to recover its sunk costs. This follows from the
fact that the less efficient single-line route is still more profitable for Carrier
A at a division that permits Carrier B enough revenue to recover its sunk cost.
In fact, Carrier A must apply a price squeeze if it is to have an incentive to
voluntarily interchange traffic after it has been relieved of the merger
conditions. As Panel 3 shows, the joint-line route is more profitable (assuming
a sufficiently low A) for Carrier A than the single-line route. But this occurs
only because Carrier A appropriates all of Carrier B's net revenues necessary
to amortize sunk costs and appropriates almost all the benefits of Carrier B's
efficiency gains (all except A).
The price squeeze is not an unintended consequence of the voluntary
negotiations theory. The example of voluntary negotiations of competitive
access in Figure 2 demonstrates that the permissive theory can only 'operate to
route traffic over the more efficient joint-line route via a price squeeze against
the carrier seeking competitive access. According to its own assumptions, the
theory works to achieve efficiency as measured by incremental costs only if
the bottleneck carrier applies the price squeeze. The incentive to open up
competitive access to a more efficient entrant depends on the bottleneck
carrier's ability to capture all or most all of the net revenues, most particularly
the other carrier's efficiency advantages. Otherwise there is no incentive for
Carrier A to hold open the more efficient route. (Panels 3 and 4 in Figure 2
depict this conclusion.)
32. Professor Baumol has repeatedly reminded us of rail carriers' need for revenues in excess of long
run incremental costs:
If a railroad were to set its rates equal to the corresponding marginal or variable cost (or the
long run incremental cost) none of its traffic could be expected to make any contribution
toward the railroad's fixed and common costs-maintenance and replacement of track, roadbed,
signals, switching and loading facilities. This is clearly so even if prices are set equal to long
run incremental cost, including the railroad's incremental capital needed only to provide the
service in question. Such a set of rates is clearly not economically compensatory, for it permits
the railroad to cover only a portion of its total costs.
Reply Verified Statement of William J. Baumol (Feb. 21, 1995) at 36, Santa Fe (Finance docket No.
30,4000) (emphasis added).
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Panel 3 shows that, without a regulatory or private contract negotiated prior
to the more efficient connecting carrier sinking its costs, there is no system of
voluntary negotiations that will simultaneously achieve two necessary
prerequisites for economic efficiency: (1) Carrier A will have an incentive
voluntarily to allow the traffic to move over the most efficient route; and (2)
Carrier B will price sufficiently in excess of incremental costs to recover its
total costs and survive in the long run.
This inconsistency may be seen by comparing Panel 2 with Panel 3. If
Carrier B is able to recover sunk costs of $10 and its incremental costs of $10,
Carrier A has no incentive, in the absence of a contractual or regulatory
constraint, voluntarily to allow the traffic to move over the more efficient route
because the single-line route is most profitable (Panel 2). Therefore Carrier A
refuses to interline unless the more efficient joint-line route is more profitable
to Carrier A as a result of a price squeeze. But then Carrier B cannot recover
its sunk cost (Panel 3).
Panel. 3 can hardly be characterized as competition on equal terms.
Professors Baumol and Willig's theory assumes a price squeeze in which
Carrier B must hand over some or all of its efficiency gains to Carrier A in
order to gain access to the market. The efficiency gains go to the carrier
controlling access, not the carrier achieving the efficiency gains.
F. Impediments to Voluntary Negotiations
Panel 4 illustrates that the situation could even be worse for short-run
economic efficiency: Carrier A may not apply Professors Baumol and Willig's
price squeeze. Here Carrier A may incur $6 in transaction costs from applying
the price squeeze that are greater than Carrier B's efficiency gains of $5.
Therefore, it is unprofitable for Carrier A to incur the transaction costs
necessary to engage in the price squeeze. Rather Carrier A would prefer
foreclosing Carrier B and offering only a single-line rate. Other explanations
for choosing Panel 4 over Panel 3 would be the inability of Carrier A's
management to understand Professors Baumol and Willig's model (bounded
rationality in economics) or uncertainty over the size of Carrier B's greater
efficiency (imperfect information). Despite hints in Baumol and Sidak that
voluntary negotiations will solve the problem, and despite Professors Baumol
and Willig's frequent statements in support of that theory in actual applications,
Baumol and Sidak imply at points that regulators should intervene. They also
point out that the parity principle would prevent Carrier A from appropriating
Carrier B's efficiency gains in the above example.
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G. Results from Applying the Parity Principle
Panel 5 assumes that regulators take Baumol and Sidak's apparent advice
to intervene and require Carrier A to grant competitive access to Carrier B
under the parity principle. As the numbers indicate, the revenue division is $15
for Carrier B and $85 for Carrier A. This result may be reached either by
calculating a price of access to Carrier B equal to Carrier A's direct cost ($40)
plus Carrier A's opportunity cost ($45) or a revenue division to Carrier B equal
to Carrier A's avoided cost ($15). While the rule does prevent Carrier A from
appropriating Carrier B's efficiency gains, it does not solve the problem of
revenue adequacy of the more efficient connecting carrier, who is now short
$5 instead of $10.
The example also illustrates a number of interesting features of the parity
principle. First, there is no incentive for the carrier controlling competitive
access to adopt Baumol and Sidak's pricing rule voluntarily. By definition
under the rule, Carrier A receives the same net revenues of $45 regardless of
whether Carrier B is granted access.
Second, the parity principle is an improvement over the perfect price
squeeze from Carrier B's perspective only because the carrier seeking access
was more efficient than the carrier controlling access. In the more general case
in which regulators seek to encourage equally efficient carriers to compete on
the basis of price, the parity principle squeezes Carrier B down to its
incremental costs of $ 10, and only the carrier controlling access has any hope
of recovering total costs. Clearly the parity principle does not achieve
competition on equal terms under these circumstances.
Third, we can see that the parity principle ignores the problem of Carrier
B's recovery of its sunk costs. The $10 in revenues to Carrier A needed to
recover its sunk cost are treated as opportunity costs to Carrier B when the
more efficient carrier gets the business. This example illustrates once again the
problems that arise when the assumptions that Baumol and Sidak adopt in
supporting the parity principle are no longer valid.
H. Voluntary Negotiations Do Not Necessarily Produce the Parity Principle
Voluntary negotiations do not necessarily produce the parity principle.
Comparing Panel 3 and Panel 5 shows that voluntary regulations (Panel 3) can
produce a price of access to Carrier A which is well in excess of the price
dictated by the parity principle. The excess is equal to the portion of Carrier
B's efficiency gain which is appropriated by Carrier A. 33 Baumol and Sidak
33. Note that the complaint that the more efficient competitor's efficiency gains are appropriated by
the incumbent is directed to the theory of voluntary negotiations, not to the parity principle, as implied by
Baumol and Sidak at footnote 14 of their article. Baumol & Sidak, supra note 1, at n. 14.
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claim that the parity principle will produce a price equal to the price that
Carrier A charges itself and that prices higher than this level will "perhaps
seriously" handicap the rival's ability to compete.34 How then are we to
interpret the frequent arguments advanced by proponents of the parity principle
that voluntary negotiations will produce the economically efficient price?
In actual practice, without regulatory intervention railroad executives often
simply cancel the joint-line route. 35 After all, that result accomplishes Carier
A's desires under the preexisting contractual or merger condition
regime-divert the traffic to the single-line route to achieve net revenues of
$45. Indeed, it no longer must compete to accomplish this result if it simply
refuses to deal. Carrier A locks up the business with a minimum of
administrative expenses and management resource. One letter to a tariff
publishing bureau will suffice and Carrier A will not need to hire an economist
to both explain the new theory to management and calculate incremental costs
of thousands of movements.
Allowing Carrier A to eliminate the merger conditions or break the
contract with Carrier B because they are inconsistent with the parity principle
or the results of voluntary negotiations will harm efficiency. Clearly no carrier,
even though more efficient, would have voluntarily entered into a situation of
either Panel 3 or Panel 4. Carrier B's incentives to undertake further investment
will be deterred by the success of Carrier A's opportunistic behavior. Moreover,
Carrier B's lesson will not be lost on other regulated firms. Regulated firns
which rely on the cooperation of competitors who control bottleneck facilities
may subsequently require higher expected rates of return in order to contract
with the owners of such facilities. If Carrier B is foreclosed altogether, the
traffic will automatically move over the less efficient route. Furthermore,
Carrier A's incentive to control costs and improve its system will be blunted
if it no longer has to compete with Carrier B. Moreover, even if it still
participates (Panel 3), Carrier B no longer has incentives to invest in efficiency-
enhancing activities.
Conclusion
The parity principle does not provide a general solution to the competitive
access problem. Rather, rules for pricing competitive access must follow from
the broad vision of the appropriate regulatory transition to deregulation. Claims
of general applicability for the rule are based on extrapolation of results to
34. Id. at 173.
35. For example, in Chesapeake 0. Ry. v. United States, 704 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 19X3), Conrail, by
canceling certain types of favorable rates on some routes, effectively engaged in wholesale route cancellation
without sufficient concern for whether the canceled routes were more efficient than the routes Conrail
maintained. Id. at 376, 378-80.
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situations where the facts do not comport with the explicit and implicit
assumptions employed in the hypothetical examples. For example, applying the
rule to the problem of competitive access in the rail industry ignores the
problem of recovering costs sunk in the prior regulatory regime.
We can now see the harm from belief in the parity principle as a generally
applicable rule for pricing competitive access, especially when combined with
the theory of voluntary negotiations in practical examples. Contractual and
regulatory mechanisms for allowing more efficient competitors to achieve
access to the market and protect themselves from opportunistic behavior are
denounced as inconsistent with efficient component pricing. Confident in the
belief that the parity principle has wide applicability to practical problems even
when the facts are inconsistent with the assumptions in stylized hypothetical
examples, believers in the rule urge courts and regulators to overthrow efficient
regulatory rules and contracts in favor of voluntary negotiations. The net result
can be a step backwards from developing efficient rules for competitive access
designed to encourage a successful transition to deregulation. There is no
substitute for a careful assessment of the regulatory goals and institutional
circumstances on a case-by-case basis to determine the economically efficient
approach for pricing competitive access.
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